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WHO

IS TO JUDGE?*

HansOberdiek
College
Swarthmore

The title of this paper-"Who Is to Judge?"-might just as well be, "Whoseto
Judge?": that is, whose right and/or responsibility is it to judge? That this is so
will, I hope, become clear in what follows.
The question, Who is to Judge? is seldom a genuine request for an answer.
Rather, it is usually intended rhetorically,implying that no one can or ought to
judge. Preciselywhat is implied, however, is often unclear. It may mask a claim
that no one ever has any right to judge anything. Alternatively,it may be a claim
that no one is ever in any position to judge anything. Or perhaps it claims that
there are never any acceptable standardsor principles one may use in judging.
Finally, it may be a way of claiming that there are no acceptableproceduresone
may use in judging.
Consideredas unrestrictedclaims, each of these is clearlyand obviously false.
Individualsoften have a legal right-sometimes, indeed, a legal duty-to judge.
In legal disputes between states, for instance, federal courts have the legal right
and duty to settle the dispute. Moreover,people are often in a good-sometimes
ideal-position to judge. They may occupy this position through training, as in
the case of those who grade apples and oranges; through designatedposition, as in
the case of umpires;through experience,as in the case of connoisseursof wine; or
through sheer (bad) luck, as in the case of a witness to an accident. Naturally,
these positions are not exclusive: a surgeon may be in a good position to know
what needs to be removed from a patient because of his training, designated
position at the operating table, and experience. Analogous considerationswould
demonstratethe falsity of the other two possible contentions.
Those who rhetorically ask, Who is to Judge? will protest that they never
intended their claims to have an unrestrictedrange. Rather, they will continue,
they mean them to extend only to moral and nonconventional value judgments.
And that is fair enough, though it would be worthwhile to ask why ethics should

*An earlier version of this paper was read at the University of Florida in April 1975. I am
grateful to the Ring Committee on Social Ethics for giving me the opportunity to deliver this paper
and to those in the audience who provided instructive and helpful criticisms.
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be singled out for special treatment.I suspect we would find an implicit, if not
explicit, appealto certainau courantnotions; namely, that the gulf separatingfacts
from values, 'is' from 'ought,' prevents moral utterances from being anything
more than expressions of emotion or expressions of personal (or social) commitment.
Ignoring these suspicions, let us look instead at the alternativeclaims masked
by the question, Who is to Judge?: First, no one ever has any moral right to judge
the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness,of any act, policy, state of affairs,
or institution; second, no one is ever in any position to make a reasoned moral
judgment; third, there are no reasonable,justifiable moral standards,principles,
rules, or criteriaone may use in making moral judgments;and, fourth, there are no
reasonable,justifiable proceduresfor settling moral disputes or for solving moral
problems.
Each of these claims has distinct assumptions and implications, and therefore
distinct arguments can be urged for and against each. The third, for instance,
entails that no moral assertion is well grounded, though this is not entailed by
either the first or second contention. Or, to consider another example, one might
argue that there are sound moral principles but that the complexity of human
affairs is such that no one can apply them with any assurance,hence no one has
any moral right to judge. The point is simply that each claim, its assumptions,
implications,and supporting arguments,must be distinguishedif progress is to be
made in determiningthe scope and soundness of the contentions embodied in the
rhetoricalquestion before us. The meaning and scope of the first two claims, for
example, require further clarification. I shall construe both as silent regarding
one's moral right to make judgmentson moral matters;that is, neither states nor
implies that one may or may not say, believe, or think that X is right or wrong,
good or bad. Rather,I shall construeboth as holding that no one has a moral right
to determinethe outcome of any moral matter;that is, both imply that no one has
a moral right to permit, require,or prevent any action or policy on purely moral
grounds. Thus, it might be contended that a teacher has the right to require a
student to reada certainbook, providedthat the grounds are educational,but that
no one has any right to require anyone to read anything if one's grounds are
merely moral.
Each claim before us must be met, and met squarely.However, they cannot
be met at once, all at once, or once and for all, since, as we have seen already,each
involves varied, complex, and far-reachingissues. I shall confine myself to a
considerationof how these claims might be countered in a specific instance.
We humans wear out, and when we do, we die. Sometimes, however, only a
part of us wears out or is damaged,the rest of us remaining in passablecondition.
Yet if a vital organ is involved, death is almost certainto follow, unless we can be
provided with one or more spare parts. Here there is some good news and some
bad news. The good news is that spare parts, both artificial and natural, are
availablefor use; the bad news is that there are not now and perhapsnever will be
enough spare parts-or adequate funding-to go around. Consequently, many
people die each year who would live if only there were enough artificial kidney
machines,kidneys,hearts, lungs, and other lifesaving devices and organs. Thus the
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problemmust be faced of determiningwho is to live and who is to die. It is to this
problem, the problem of allocation, that one is likely to hear the rhetorical response, But who is to judge?
One answer to this latter question is good as far as it goes, and, philosophically, it goes pretty far. The question is not so much who shall judge, but how
should anyone judge? That is, what principles and criteriaare morally relevant in
determining who should receive scarce lifesaving organs and devices? Once we
determinehow any of us is to judge, that is, once we determinecorrector justifiable standardsof judgment, then the question of who is to judge will fade in
importance,for presumablya substantialnumber of people will be able to apply
such standardswith roughly uniform results.
As I say, philosophically this answer goes pretty far. Mathematiciansand
scientists are seldom asked, Who is to judge what the implications of Godel's
theorem are?or Who is to judge whether aerosol spraysdisturb the ozone layer?
The proper response is that any competent and informed mathematicianor scientist can judge provided, of course, that he or she knows the correct standardsto
employ; if there are no correctstandards,or if there is great controversyregarding
them, then at best one can only make an informed guess. Mathematiciansand
scientists therefore strive to formulate or discover correct standardsof judgment.
A modified form of this direct approachis not out of place in ethics. Indeed,
it is evidencedin recent published contributionsto discussionsregardingabortion,
civil disobedience,affirmative action, the allocation of scarceresources,and other
contemporarysocial-issues. That is, an attempt is made to establish a sound,
justifiable set of criteria for determining if and under what conditions certain
kinds of acts or policies may be vindicated.After decades during which philosophers confined themselves almost exclusively to metaethical issues, this development is as welcome as it is refreshing.
But social practices and institutions change more slowly than individual beliefs, a fact which is well known and, on the whole, desirable.As a consequence,
however, exclusive reliance on the direct approachmay have little effect, for those
with effective control of practicesand institutions may not hear, take notice, or
accept the conclusions of those social critics out of power. I shall therefore adopt
a less direct route in supplementing-but not replacing-the more direct route in
the hope that the two together will be more effective in bringing about desirable
social change. At the same time, I hope to go some distancein counteringthe four
claims discussed and listed above.
If, for the time being only, we set aside questions of how we are to decide
who shall receive scarce lifesaving devices and organs, do we have an answer to
those who ask, Who is to judge?Although physicians are not the sole judges of
who gets what in these matters at present, certainly their judgment carries the
greatestweight; for the most part, indeed, in makinga judgment a physician (or a
group of physicians) will be passingjudgment. We must not deceive ourselves:
moral judgments determining who shall live and who shall die are, will be, and
must be made. There is no alternative.
Some may deny that physicians are either making or passing moral judgments; rather, it may be argued, all judgments are, can, and should be purely
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medical and scientific, not moral. Now it is incontrovertiblethat judgments, and
thereforedecisions,regardingthe allocationof scarcelifesaving devices and organs
involve purely medical matters. But if one concludes from this that such judgments belong solely to physicians, then one may just as well argue that the
question of capital punishment would be best left to electrical and chemical
engineers!
To maintain the myth that questions regarding the allocation of scarce resources,whether in medicine, economics, or elsewhere, are purely or even primarily technical and scientific is comforting, because we can avoid responsibility for
their answers, since few of us are technicians or scientists. But to hide from our
responsibility in this way is not only "bad faith"; it is also bad judgment and
worse policy, as it effectivly preventsus from examining our policies and practices
from an examined moral point of view. If we persist in masking the moral
dimensions of problems of allocation,we can hardly hope to arrive at their satisfactory solution, for no problem can be solved if it is persistently misdescribed.
After conceding this much, it may still be contended that, since allocation
problems are problems for physicians,physicians alone should solve them. Again,
it is incontrovertiblethat allocativeproblems are problems for physicians,and they
no doubt feel them more keenly and acutely than most of us. They are not,
however, merely problems for physicians; they are equally, if not more so, problems for those affected, their families, and-though to a lesser extent-everyone
else. They are,in short, social problems.Notice, moreover,that anyone advocating
this line of defense is smuggling in his own moral predilections,for implicit in
this defense is the claim that only those for whom X is an acutely felt moral
problem have a moral right or are in a position to resolve it. Even if this were so,
which arguablyit is not, it would seem to imply that prospectiveusers of scarce
medical resourcesshould have a loud voice in determiningcriteriaof allocation,as
they, above all, are acutely affected by any criteria that determine who shall get
how much of what. One reason questions of allocation seem to be peculiarly
problems for physicians is simply that physicians now possess virtually unchallenged power to answer them.
Here it may be appropriateto say that nothing in this paper should be
construedas.a harangueagainst physicians.For the most part they have actedmore
decently than the rest of us, since they recognized from the beginning that hard
moral decisions cannot be avoided, and they have not shrunk from the inordinate
burden of responsibility our unwillingness has thrust upon them. Because the
burden is inordinate,however, what was not particularlysought by physicians in
the first place must be shared by more of us. No matter how much we reclaim
abdicatedresponsibility,physicians will continue to carryheavy responsibilities.
There may be those who still cling to the belief that physicians alone should
decide questions of allocation on the ground that, in these matters, physicians
alone are authorities.But this is simply a confusion. Grantedthat a board-certified
physicianis an authorityin his particularspecialty,it is a non sequiturto conclude
that he is an authority on any moral aspects of allocative questions. Indeed, it is
doubtful that anyone could be an authorityin the requisite sense. The difficulty is
not that there are no correct or acceptablecriteria;in large part the difficulty has
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to do with what it is to be an authority.One authorityon the concept of authority
writes: "A person is an authorityin virtue of possessing extensive knowledge of a
field or subject-matter.There seem to be no limits on what the field or subjectmatter can be. . . . But the knowledge. . . must form a connected whole ...
which has sufficient unity that it can be given a name."'
While there can be and in fact are authorities on ethical theory, and on the
issues involved in a given moral problem, it does not follow that anyone is an
authority on, say, the morality of abortion, the limits of justified civil disobedience, or the proper distributionof health services. Of course, one can and should
become informed regardingthe multiplicity of issues comprisingmoral problems,
yet even complete information,whateverthat might mean, would not be sufficient
to transformone into a moral expert or authority.What more is requiredwill not
be discussed here. Even if there are no moral authorities in the requisite sense,
however, it does not follow that moral-judgments are necessarily vacuous or
unfounded or untrue. Only when there exists a broad, unified, and widely shared
network of moral beliefs and ethical theory does the notion of a moral authority
make much sense. Perhaps such networks have existed in times past; certainly
none exist now. Moral and evaluative judgments can nonetheless be meaningful,
well grounded,and true for all of that: we simply will not have the luxury of any
shortcutappealto authority. In holding that there are no (present) moral authorities, one need not deny that the judgment of certain individuals deserves great
weight. Some people, because of their experience, training, integrity, and other
virtues of character,intellect, and insight, appearto have an extraordinarygrasp of
moral issues-even when the reasons adduced for their judgments do not seem
especiallypersuasive.Why this appearsto be so must be left for another occasion.
Yet even if one could become a moral authority in the requisite sense, there
is little reason to believe that physicianswould be in a particularlygood position
to become moral authorities. The years of training and experience required to
become a skilled clinician often rob physiciansof time to think through complicated moral issues; they are rightly preoccupiedwith thinking through complicated
medical issues.
Why, then, are physicians often accepted as moral authorities regardingthe
allocation of scarcelifesaving devices and organs?At least part of the answer lies
in the fact that a physician is normallyin authorityas well as being an authority:
"A person is in authority by virtue of occupying a position or office in a social
institution with an hierarchialstructure."2Now we need not quarrelwith the fact
that physicians are in authority, that is, that they hold positions of authority
regardingpurely medical matters.Ideally,a physician is in authoritybecausehe or
she is an authorityon medical matters.If one acknowledges that no physicianjust as no philospher-is a moral authority, then one must question why any
physician should be in authorityover allocative questions which are primarilyand
essentially moral.

1. Gary Young, "Authority," CanadianJournal of Philosophy3 Uune 1974): 563.
2. Ibid., p. 564.
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I shall mention, though only in passing, a further explanation for the fact
that physiciansare frequently acceptedas moral authorities.It can be tracedin part
to what Max Weber calls charismaticauthority: authorityresting on "devotion to
the specific and exceptional sanctity,heroism or exemplarycharacterof an individual person, and of the normative patternsor order revealedor ordainedby him".'
To this may be added the propensity of man to respect the moral and political
judgmentsof those who possess arcaneknowledge or wield great power. So physicians, regardlessof their own preferences,are often miscast in the leading role of
moral authorities.
One might accept all or most of what has been said thus far, yet persist in
maintainingthat no one has a right to make moral judgmentsor that no one is in
a position to pass moral judgment,especially if there are no moral authorities.Yet
it is not clear how this could be made out. It might be argued that if physicians
have no moral right to judge, then, since physicians are not alone in not being
moral authorities,no one has any right to judge. But this is morally absurd.If no
one has a moralright to judge, then no one ought to judge; consequently,available
but scarcespareparts ought not be distributedat all. And this is as unjustified as
it is silly, for the absence of moral authoritiesdoes not entail the absenceof moral
rights. In the kind of case before us it is imperativethat we establish a system of
such rights just because the consequencesof denying any individual or group the
moral right to judge would be disastrous.The question then becomes, Who shall
be granted the moral and legal right to judge, and on what grounds? Or, as was
stated at the outset, Whose is it to judge?
Clearly, everyone's interests are involved to some extent, and potentially
everyone's interests are involved to a large extent, for anyone may need a spare
partor two before wearing out altogether.Now if the concept of a moral right has
any validity, then everyone (or nearlyeveryone) is eligible to judge, in the sense of
possessing a moral right to pass judgment, that is, to affect individual conduct,
social practices,and institutions. For suppose that no one possessed a moral right
to pass judgment. On this supposition the very concept of a moral right would
lose signification: nothing can be a right which does not entitle someone to affect
conduct, practices, or institutions. Indeed, the only reason to maintain that everyone has a right to hold moral views is that we wish to protect one's ability to
affect the thought and action of oneself and others. After all, we need not invoke
the majestic concept of the right to protect one's ability to hold moral views
simpliciter:everyone holds moral beliefs regardlessof any right to do so.
An ethical system may of coursebe devised which dispenseswith the concept
of a right altogether, and it is sometimes maintainedthat the ancient Greeks did
just that. Perhaps,though it is risky to infer from the fact that ancient Greek has
no term which readily translates as 'rights' that the Greeks had no concept of
rights. Certainlythey believed that there were what may be called 'entitlements'to
action, political office, and propertywith clearly demarcatedlimits: citizens, met-

3. Max Weber, The Theoryof Socialand EconomicOrganization,trans. A. M. Henderson and
Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 324 ff.
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ics, women, and slaves possessed distinct sets of entitlements, for example. And, as
Socratesnever questioned, Athenian jurieswere certainlyentitled to pass judgment
on a variety of matters which came before them. It is true that Athenians do not
appearto have had a place in their system for individual rights, but that does not
show that they lacked a concept of individual rights, let alone any concept of
rights whatever.Whether or not Athenians or other ancient Greeks had a concept
of rights similar to ours, it does appear that their conceptual system was rich
enough to fulfill the central functions rights serve. In particular,every society
must have some way of determiningwho is eligible to judge fundamentalissues
and on what grounds. While this is normally accomplishedthrough legal systems
in complex societies, only if these legal systems are morally grounded do they
deserve our respect, support, and compliance. And our system of legal rights is
grounded, in part, by appeal to moral rights.
Obviously, from the premise that nearly everyone is eligible to have a right
to judge it does not follow that everyone actually possesses that right, for then
nothing would ever be decided and that would be self-defeating. A somewhat
analogous situationobtains in law. Nearly everyone is eligible to have the right to
sit on a jury, though only a handful of people actually possess that right in any
given case. But can there be anything like a jury to pass on moral issues raisedin
connection with the allocation of scarcelifesaving devices and organs, and, if so,
how might it work? These questions must be faced, for perhapsthe main reason
physiciansalone now have the right and duty to judge is simple and persuasive:no
one has come up with a better alternative.
Here is one alternative.In each state a special Lay Allocation Boardwould be
chargedwith developing a set of normative (as opposed to medical) criteriaphysicians must use in selecting those who may receive scarce lifesaving devices and
organs. Medical considerationscould not be completely excluded from consideration, of course, as degree of medical risk might well be thought appropriateto
take into account when spare parts are especially scarce.The envisaged allocation
board would have an advisory staff much as a congressional committee does.
Solicited and unsolicited position papers would be considered from interested
individualsand groups, and open hearings might be held from time to time. The
boarditself might wish to publish its own tentative position papersas its deliberations progressed.In due course, after the committee's final recommendationshad
been promulgatedand time providedfor challenges to them, the board'scriteriaof
allocation would become binding.
Much more obviously needs to be said. Preciselywhich proceduresare adopted by the boardis extremely important,for instance, becauseproceduresinfluence
outcome. Although little more will be said, a brief discussion of the board's
composition may be helpful. Clearly,every member ought to be disinterested;that
is, like an ideal judge or umpire, no board member should have a vested interest
in the outcome of the board'sdeliberationsor decisions. Moreover, each member
would have to possess the intelligence and capacity to understand the medical,
moral, and social ramificationsof alternativesets of criteria.Beyond these, there
are other characteristicsone would naturallylook for: the ability to think clearly,
to articulateone's reasons for and against alternativeproposals, to stick by one's
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convictions without being bullheaded,and so on. In general, one would look for
the sort of intelligence, integrity, and judgmentrequiredof anyone in a position of
great responsibility.
Boardmemberswould also have to have the capacity,ability, and willingness
to put themselves in a position where they can become competent to judge.
Plausibility is lent to the claim that no one is ever in any position to make
reasoned moral judgments because too often we are satisfied to make casual,
uninformed, and therefore irresponsiblejudgments. As becoming competent entails becoming informed, board memberswould be requiredto review and discuss
case studies, interview physicians,and acquaintthemselves with popular,religious,
and philosophic literatureon the subject.
Finally, board members should represent more than one sex, race, religious
denomination,and socioeconomic class, for assumptionsone brings to moral deliberations are often unconsciously biased. A case in point may be found in the
BritishMedicalJournalof March 11, 1967, where Dr. M. A. Wilson assertsthat in
selecting patientsfor haemodialysis,"gainful employment in a well chosen occupation is necessaryto achieve the best results" since "only the minority wish to live
on charity."4It is arguable,I suppose, that the gainfully employed offer the best
medical risks, but it is evident that Wilson has something quite different in mind.
One can only attributesuch errantnonsense to class bias or some similar prejudice.
Now one can imagine, though only barely, some boardof allocation incorporating
Wilson's pronouncementinto their own set of allocative criteria,but at least it
would be out in the open and subjectto challenge, legal and otherwise. As things
now stand, decisions may be made on the basis of widely divergent subjective
views of physicianswith only a slight chance that their views may be challenged
or even known, save for an occasionalcolleague.
In requiringthat board membersrepresentdiverse backgrounds,it should not
be thought that they are to representtheir backgrounds.One can be representative
of a group without being its representative.The reason for requiringbroadrepresentation is not that members should serve as appointed representativesof their
naturalconstituencies.Far from it. Boardmembersmust think for themselves, and
not think of themselves as representingany special interest group. The primary
reason for requiringbroad representationis that one's perspective is often influenced, for good or ill, by one's background.
In addition to the board of allocation, hospitals which authorize spare-part
surgeryand treatmentmust have a review panel with the power and responsibility
to see that the criteriaare understood,instituted, and followed. At least one-third
of such panels should be laymen and at least one member should be an attorney
experienced in the area of medical law. The remaining members could be staff
physicians. These panels could also recommend changes to its parent board of
allocation.
Needless to say, the foregoing is merely a sketch. And no doubt the criteria
4. J. D. N. Nabarro, F. M. Parsons, R. Shakman, and M. A. Wilson, "Selection of Patients
for Haemodialysis," British MedicalJournal (March 11, 1967), p. 623; quoted in Rescher (n. 5
below).
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of allocation eventually decided upon would be imperfect. But imperfection itself
implies objectivity,for where there is no objectivity there is neither perfection nor
imperfection. Any set of criteriawill have its critics: criticism may come from
those who believe that their interests and concerns have been slighted or ignored
altogether;from those who express minority moral points of view; or from those
who believe that the proposed criteriaare vague, ambiguous, needlessly cumbersome, or otherwise unworkable.Such criticism must be met forthrightly, and that
should not be an impossibility: to meet criticism does not mean to satisfy one's
critics-it means to give a reasonedjustification for one's policies.
In defense of my proposal, I shall consider a few prima facie objections
which might be lodged against it; there are undoubtedlymore.
1. "Choosing board members will become a political football because the
AMA and other pressuregroups will have a vested and intense interest in how the
members will be chosen and who will choose them." The composition of allocation boards could become a political football, though it is unlikely, in that any
game played with this particularfootball would almost certainlyend in a loss for
all sides! Still, it is a genuine dangerwhich must be guardedagainst. Perhapsone
safeguardwould be to have the governor, along with legislative leadersfrom each
majorparty,select among candidatesrecommendedby responsiblereligious, educational, and social organizations,such as labor unions. A further safeguardwould be
to appoint boardmembers for three- to five-yearnonrenewableterms. While such
boards would have some of the functions of our regulatoryagencies, they would
have quite different concerns and fewer temptations. They would be less likely to
be faced, for example, with constantly shifting economic conditions, nor would
they be faced with known sums of money or known beneficiaries of their decisions; and finally, it is unlikely that they would be faced with conflicts of interest.
One last point. We need not fear any great bureaucracyemerging from my proposal: we need only the board,its researchand secretarialstaff, and the various review
panels.
2. "By laying down binding criteria, allocation boards will, in effect, pass
down death sentences on individuals who are not permitted their day in court.
Further,physicians will find themselves straitjacketedby an anonymous board."
There is more emotion in this objection than reason. First, any selection procedure-whether conducted by a physician or a board-involves, or may involve,
denying lifesaving help to some. The only difference is that this fact is now pretty
well hidden from public view. By making allocative criteriapublic, everyone will
have a cleareridea of where they stand.
There is no reason, second, why someone who felt wronged could not appeal,
at least to the review panel. Even now a disgruntled patient (or his heirs!) can
bring suit if he believes that he has been denied what is legally his. Under present
conditions, however, one who is rejected as a recipient of a lifesaving device or
organ has little if any opportunityto appeal his physician'sdecision and so is also
denied his day in court.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that physicianswill be straitjacketed,for
there is no reasonto believe that all mannerof discretionwill be taken from them.
We should not assume that allocative boards would even be tempted to adopt
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complex and highly restrictive criteria.John Stuart Mill once remarkedthat any
moral principlewould work badly if we supposed universalidiocy to be conjoined
to it! The same is true of proposalsfor social reform. Surely boards of allocation
would seek to establish relativelysimple, plausible, and enforceablecriteriathat are
likely to win high acceptanceand therefore compliance among physicians and the
public generally.
3. "No matterhow just their criteria,the proposedboardsof allocation would
serve only to hide the main problem:namely, the refusal of our state and national
governments to spend what it should on medical care. To set up criteria of
allocation makes it look as if lifesaving devices and even organs are necessarilyin
scarcesupply, when in fact there could be more than enough to go aroundif only
the government stepped in with adequatefunding for research,development, and
treatment."There is a great deal of merit in this objection. Nevertheless, there is
nothing incompatiblewith establishing allocative criteriaand working for fundamental social change. Moreover,the publicity allocation boardswould engenderis
one way of bringing our inadequatefunding of medical care to the attention of the
public and its legislators. Further,if a modified lottery were adopted as a method
of selection, even the wealthy would have an interest in seeing to it that fundamental changesin the financing of medical carewere undertaken.Recall that once
a lottery replacedcollege defermentsin our draft system, both college studentsand
their parents took a far greater interest in the Vietnam War. Last, while kidney
machines may someday become as plentiful and inexpensive as power lawn mowers, it is unlikely that hearts, lungs, kidneys, or eyes will become plentiful. It is
therefore unrealisticto suppose that we shall ever be so fortunate that allocative
problems disappear.
I believe that a set of principles can be formulated and defended that meet
reasonablestandardsof acceptability,and that these principles will emerge as the
envisagedboardsof allocation progressin their deliberations.As Nicholas Rescher
points out, any reasonableselection procedure"must be simpleenough to be readily
intelligible, and it must be plausible,that is, patently reasonablein a way that can
be apprehendedeasily and without involving ramified subtleties." Without going
into great detail, it might be useful to discuss Rescher'sown suggestions, especially since they appearto violate his own regulative requirements.
Accordingto Rescher, two distinguishabletypes of criteriaare needed: criteria
of inclusion and criteriaof comparison."We can think of the selection as being
made by a two stage process: (1) the selection from among all possible candidates
(by a suitable screening process) of a group to be taken under serious consideration as candidatesfor therapy, and then (2) the actual singling out, within this
group, of the particularindividualsto whom therapyis to be given. Thus the first
process narrows down the range of comparative choice by eliminating en bloc
whole categories of potential candidates. The second process calls for a more
refined, case-by-casecomparisonof those candidatesthat remain."6This is exactly
5. Nicholas Rescher, "The Allocation of Exotic Medical Lifesaving Therapy," Ethics 79
(April 1969): 175; reprinted in Ethicsand Public Policy,edited by Tom L. Beauchamp (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975), pp. 425-41.
6. Ibid., p. 175.
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one stage too many: the second stage calls for implausibly refined judgments.
Reasonablegrounds can be providedfor excluding those who are criticallyill with
other diseases,psychologically unable (or unwilling) to cope with the tremendous
stress involved in organ transplantsand continuing renal dialysis, or very elderly.
Similarly,reasonablegrounds can be providedfor including those whose prospects
are particularlygood, children and parentsof children under twenty-one,and those
who need only the temporaryuse of kidney machines. No doubt there are a few
other reasonablecriteriaof inclusion. But to suggest that case-by-casecomparisons
be made within a pool of selected candidatessupposes principles, standards,and
criteriathat simply cannot be established.
Two of Rescher's proposed criteriaof comparisonare clearly untenable: neither can be adequatelyformulated nor justly applied. In the course of defending
what he calls "the potential future-contributionsfactor," Rescher argues:
In "choosing to save" one life rather than another, "the society," through the mediation of the
particularmedical institution in question . . . is clearly warrantedin considering the likely patternof
by the patient (adequate recovery assumed), considering his age, talent,
future servicesto be rendered
training, and past record of performance. In its allocations of ELT [Exotic Lifesaving Therapy],
society "invests" a scarce resource in one person as against another and is thus entitled to look to the
probable prospective"return"on its investment. . . . The fact that the standardis difficult to apply
is certainly no reason for not attempting to apply it. The problem of ELT selection is inevitably
burdened with difficult standards.7

As "a morally necessary correlative"of the above prospective service criterion,
Rescher would add a retrospectiveservice criterion, mainly on grounds of equity
(though he believes that a utilitariandefense could also be attempted).8
Now in deciding to support the research, capital investment, salaries, and
treatmentcosts involved in ELT, we must indeed ask whether our investment of
time, talent, and money might not be better spent. Arguably,we ought to spend
more on prevention of various pedestriancauses of death and ill health than on
exotic lifesaving therapies. Even assuming that conventional methods of prevention and treatment need not suffer because of expensive exotic therapies, the
demandfor replacementof vital organswill continue to outstrip the supply for the
indefinite future, thus leaving us with acute problems of allocation. Yet this fact
should not lead us to embrace either of Rescher's criteria.We need only adopt
criteriafor candidateinclusion, for example, prospect of success, life expectancy,
and family responsibilities. Should these criteria not sufficiently drain the candidate pool, then a lottery could be employed. In using a lottery, we would at once
recognize the limits of human judgment and objectivity, lessen the likelihood of
arbitraryand invidious distinctions, and diminish the amount of special pleading.
There is little need to belaborthe virtues of a lottery over Rescher'sproposed
criteria.As our most recent experiencewith the draft demonstrated,everyone has
grounds for claiming exemption-everyone, that is, except he who is poor, illiterate, or otherwise disadvantaged.This is not to say that everyone is equally deserving of having his life saved. It is only to say that any institutional (or individual)
attempt to determine whose services to society, prospective or retrospective,are
7. Ibid., p. 178.
8. Ibid., p. 179.
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more deserving imposes an impossible burden. (Nor need we fear that a lottery
within the candidatepool would exclude a president, admiral,senator, or director
of the ManhattanProject;whether justifiableor not, every system managesto find
a way of providing for such cases.)
The foregoing is not intended as a definitive statement regardingacceptable
and unacceptablecriteria;it is merelya preliminaryand cursorydiscussion of a few
obvious issues and classifications boardsof allocation would surely consider.The
boards themselves would have the task of determining selection criteria,enforcement, and appeal procedures. But perhaps enough has been said to show that
reasonablecriteriaand procedurescan be formulated and defended which would
also meet with public acceptance.Even if the outcomes of the various boards'
deliberationsare not always what we believe they should be, we shall at least have
the satisfactionof knowing where we stand. And this in itself would be a significant step forward.For in moral matters, the beginning of wisdom (as Kant saw
clearly) lies in recognizing that in the end the question, Who is to Judge? admits
of but one answer:each and every one of us must judge. The end of wisdom, of
course, lies in establishing and applying moral principles that will aid us in determining how we are to judge.
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